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Jeffrey Bub, Rob Clifton, and Bradley Monton
The Bare Theory Has No Clothes
I . What Makes the Bare Theory So Seductive?
Consider quantum theory without the collapse postulate. No experiment
has ever disconfirmed its statistical predictions. So one might reasonably
bet that no experiment ever will. If not, every possible state of anything in
the universe, from the spin states of electrons to the states of consciousness
of sentient beings, must evolve in time according to Schrodinger's equa-
tion. A theoretician's paradise . .. except for that nagging problem of how
to make sense of what the theory says will happen when we try to confirm
its statistical predictions.
The problem is worth rehearsing. Suppose m is a device that reliably
records whether an electron e's spin is up or down along some specified
direction (for simplicity: without disturbing that spin). The unitary evolu-
tion characterizing the m + e interaction will therefore map:
where '?'}m is the ready-to-measure state of m, and | 'up'}m and |'down')m
are two orthogonal recording states of m that distinguish whether e's spin
is up or down in the direction of measurement. (The quotation marks sig-
nify that, for present purposes, we can remain agnostic about precisely
what physical quantity of m these three states are eigenstates of.) If m is
set up to do its job when e is in some arbitrary superposition of up and
down spin states:
Ci \up) e + c2 \down)e, (2)
the above evolutions and the linearity of the Schrodinger equation entail
that the final state ofm + e will be:
C j \up) e \'up')m + c2 \down)e 'down')m. (3)
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Quantum theory dictates that, on looking to see what recording property
m has, there is a chance of cl |2 that an experimenter, let's call her Eve,
will see 'up,' and a chance of | c212 that she will see 'down.'
Now if the Schrodinger equation is universally valid and Eve is a com-
petent observer, we should be able to model the acquisition of her belief
about the spin state of e (which she acquires through her belief about m's
recording property) by a unitary mapping of the same general form as (1).
Then Eve's looking at m will generate the state:
where the two states of Eve in this superposition' are vectors lying in dis-
tinct eigenspaces of whatever physical quantity of Eve's brain it is that re-
cords information gathered through her senses (again, the quotation marks
allow us to remain agnostic about what physical quantity that is).
At this point, for the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics to
have something to refer to, it seems that one must say that, although (4) is
the full quantum state of e + m + Eve, in any particular case when Eve
looks at m, just one of (4)'s terms represents what Eve will actually come to
believe about e's spin. Indeed, statistical predictions aside, something like
this must be said if we are to reconcile the theory with the fact that experi-
menters like Eve always take themselves to have definite beliefs about what
their measurement devices indicate.
But the trouble is that the standard way of thinking about superpositions
in quantum mechanics prohibits attributing a definite value to any observ-
able of a system whose eigenstates are superposed by the system's quan-
tum state, as Eve's belief states are in (4). To say anything more than that
by way of underwriting the definiteness of Eve's e-spin belief with hidden
variables, worlds, minds, or what-not is standardly taken to be adding to
the theory, and that's standardly taken to be a bad thing to do. So it appears
that standard thinkers—at least those who want to uphold the universal
validity of the Schrodinger equation without introducing the collapse pos-
tulate—have backed themselves into a corner on the issue of whether ex-
perimenters like Eve have definite beliefs about their measurement out-
comes (not to mention the statistics of those outcomes).
But maybe not. David Albert (1992, 116-19) has suggested that if the
issue is simply whether it is possible to recover our everyday sense that
experimenters hold definite beliefs about the things with which they inter-
act, then that can be done with standard thinking using what Albert calls
the Bare theory.
The Bare theory promises to be just what its name suggests: a theory
on which the Schrodinger equation is universally valid, the standard way
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of thinking about superpositions is correct, and that is all there is to say.
So there are no collapses, variables, worlds, or minds postulated to save
the definiteness of Eve's belief in (4).2 The Bare theory's explanation of
why, despite all that, everyone (Eve included) will always come to believe
that her belief about e's spin is definite, is described by Albert as "amaz-
ingly cool."3
The explanation goes like this (with minor embellishment). Suppose
Eve's partner Adam is determined to figure out whether Eve has a defi-
nite belief about e's spin while in state (4). Adam cannot just ask Eve what
belief about e-spin she has while in state (4), because the linearity of the
Schrodinger equation will put her into a superposition of responding to
Adam in two different ways, and according to Albert (1992,117), "it won't
be any easier to interpret a 'response' like that than it was to interpret the
superposition of brain states in [(4)] that that response was intended to be
a description of!"
Without automatically inducing a superposition of responses, however,
Adam can simply ask Eve: "Don't tell me whether you believe the electron
to be [up] or you believe it to be [down], but tell me merely whether or not
one of those two is the case; tell me (in other words) merely whether or
not you have any particular definite belief (not uncertain and not confused
and not vague and not superposed) about the value of the [spin] of this
electron" (1992, 118). The way to model Eve answering that question
within quantum mechanics is, presumably, as follows.
If Eve is an honest and competent reporter of her mental states, then
when asked whether she has a definite e-spin belief in a state like 'Be-
lieves e-spin up')Eve, she should report Yes. For in that case, the Bare the-
ory predicts that Eve's belief will be definite, and we can assume that there
is nothing else stopping her from honestly and competently reporting that
fact. But then the same goes for how Eve will respond if she were asked
the same question by Adam while in the state | 'Believes e-spin down')Bve;
namely, she will again respond with a Yes.4
It follows that the correct way to model Eve's response to Adam's ques-
tion about the definiteness of her e-spin belief is in terms of a unitary evo-
lution that maps:
| 'Believes e-spin wp')Eve 'Ready to Answer')Eve
—> | 'Believes e-spin up')Eve \ 'Yes, I have a definite e-spin belief')Eve,
'Believes e-spin Jown')Eve | 'Ready to Answer')Eve (5)
—> 'Believes e-spin down')Eve 'Yes, I have a definite e-spin belief')Eve,
where the two states of Eve we have introduced denote the physical corre-
lates in her brain of her getting ready to answer, and responding Yes to the
question.5
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But now the cool thing is that if (5) models Eve's response to Adam, the
linearity of the Schrodinger equation demands that when she responds to
his question in superposition (4), the final state of e + m + Eve will nec-
essarily be:
which is not a superposition of Eve giving different answers, but an eigen-
state of Eve responding Yes! And so the Bare theory predicts that Yes will
definitely be Eve's answer, even when in fact she has no definite state of
belief about e-spin according to that theory (that is, according to standard
thinking about what it means to be in an uncollapsed superposition of be-
lief states). Eve is "apparently going to be radically deceived even about
what her own occurrent mental state is" (1992, 118). Albert calls a situ-
ation like this a situation in which Eve "effectively knows" what e's spin
is (1992, 120).
So the cool thing is that we can use the sparse resources of the Bare
theory to show why no two people are ever going to believe anything out
of the ordinary about the definiteness of each other's beliefs. Indeed, since
it could just as well have been Eve herself who introspects about her own
beliefs and inquires as to whether they are definite about e-spin, the Bare
theory predicts that experimenters will never believe anything out of the
ordinary about their own beliefs either.
It is rather like the situation before the fall: Both Adam and Eve were
naked, but to keep the paradise, God ensured that they knew not that
they were naked. In this case, the Schrodinger equation is what keeps the
paradise:
That is: maybe (even if the standard way of thinking about what it
means to be in a superposition is the right way of thinking about what
it means to be in a superposition) the linear dynamical laws are none-
theless the complete laws of the evolution of the entire world, and
maybe all the appearances to the contrary (like the appearance that
experiments have outcomes, and the appearance that the world doesn't
evolve deterministically) turn out to be just the sorts of delusions which
those laws themselves can be shown to bring on\ (1992, 123)
Of course, paradise in the garden of Eden did not last long. And trouble is
lurking in the Bare theoretician's paradise too. In fact, this story has at least
two problems. We shall draw out the first problem in the next section, and
identify the second, the decisive problem, in the section after that.
Albert gives further Bare theory stories to explain why experimenters
take immediately repeated measurements to yield the same determinate
result, why different experimenters measuring the same observable take
c1 |up]nup']|,Belives-spin up']eve|'Yes, I have a dfinte e-spain belief']eve+   (6)
c2 |down],|down']n|'Belives e-spain down']eve|Yes I have a definite e-spain belief]eve
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themselves to agree on the outcome, and why experimenters take the mea-
surement result statistics they gather in their laboratories to confirm the
statistical predictions of quantum mechanics (1992, 119-23). We believe
that those stories have exactly the same problems, and shall indicate why
toward the end of this chapter.6
2. The Bare Necessities
The first thing to sort out is how much of this story about Eve always tak-
ing her beliefs to be definite and responding accordingly is a necessary
consequence of the Bare theory. Albert homes in on the correct way to
model Eve's response to Adam's question by saying that she, being honest
and competent enough to assess her own mental state, would answer Yes
if she were, according to the Bare theory, in any quantum state that cor-
responds to her having a definite e-spin belief. Albert then employs that
model, defined by equations (5), in a state where the Bare theory blocks
Eve from having a definite belief. Finally, he concludes on the basis of the
linearity of the Schrodinger equation that, nevertheless, she would still re-
spond Yes. But then it would seem she cannot have been honest and com-
petent after all! Perhaps the correct conclusion is that Albert has stacked
the deck in his own favor by not modeling Eve so that she can respond as
competently and reliably as possible, whatever her circumstances.
But that conclusion is too quick. It fails to recognize that the Bare the-
ory itself sets definite limits on modeling Eve's response. We summari/e
these limits in a modest theorem.
Bare Theorem
The following are mutually inconsistent:
1. There is a unitary interaction that models Eve answering Adam's
question about the definiteness of her e-spin belief.
2. Eve's answers are always given honestly and competently on the
basis of what her beliefs are—or are not—as determined by the Bare
theory's standard thinking about superpositions. So she will answer
Yes if in an eigenstate of definite e-spin belief, and No if not.
3. The model must allow Adam (or Eve, if she is just introspect-
ing about the structure of her own beliefs) to distinguish situations
in which Eve chooses to respond (or conclude) Yes from situations in
which she chooses to respond (or conclude) No.
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The inconsistency follows easily. Let | 'Huh?')Eve be any nontrivial su-
perposition of 'Believes e-spin M/>')Eve and 'Believes e-spin down')Eve.
Assumptions 2 and 3 entail that the unitary evolution that 1 assumes to
exist must, in particular, map:
'Believes e-spin wp')Eve I 'Ready to Answer')Eve
—> 'Believes e-spin up'}Eve 'Yes, I have a definite e-spin belief'}Eve,
'Huh?')Eve | 'Ready to Answer')Eve (7)
—> | 'Huh?')Eve | 'No, I don't have a definite e-spin belief')Eve,
which it cannot, since that would be to map initially nonorthogonal vectors
onto orthogonal ones. (The contradiction continues to hold without the
idealization that in responding Eve fails to disturb her own state of belief.)
So from the point of view of the Bare theory, if we understand the the-
ory as requiring 1, 2, and 3 above for a "good" measurement of the defi-
niteness of Eve's e-spin belief, there is no good way to model Eve's re-
sponse quantum-mechanically.
Nevertheless, since quantum mechanics is everything on the Bare the-
ory, and we think we do ascertain the definiteness of each other's (and,
indeed, our own) beliefs via interactions of some sort, those interactions
must be capable of being modeled by some kind of unitary evolution. So
1 is not open to question. And 3 cannot be given up without undermining
the possibility of Eve ascertaining and reporting on what the structure of
her e-spin beliefs is, which is presumably something we do think she can
do. So 2 needs to be loosened up in some way.
But in what way? Albert takes it that the way to model Eve's response
unitarily is via an interaction of type (5). He appeals to the competency
Eve would have to report her mental state when it is an eigenstate of some
definite belief about e-spin. He then rigs the unitary interaction of (5) so
that it correlates the answer Yes to those eigenstates,7 concluding (by lin-
earity) that Eve must be completely incompetent in reporting her mental
state when in a superposition of them.
However, the following parallel line of argument is equally compelling,
and equally natural in the context of the Bare theory. Suppose, instead,
that Eve is competent to report her mental state when it is not an eigenstate
of some definite belief about e-spin. (After all, why assume a priori that
she would somehow be speechless about her lack of definite belief?) Let
'Huh?' }Eve and | 'Wha?' )Eve, not eigenstates of definite belief about e-spin,
span the same plane in the Hilbert space that represents Eve's brain states
as the eigenstates 'Believes e-spin «/?'}Eve and | 'Believes e-spin down')Evs.
do. Then in each of those noneigenstates of e-spin belief, Eve should
respond No to the question, "Do you have a definite e-spin belief?" By
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linearity, she will also respond No for any brain state in the plane. And
that includes the very states in which the Bare theory guarantees that she
will have a definite belief, namely, | 'Believes e-spin up')Eve and | 'Believes
e-spin down')Eve!
For example, if
then
If Eve (competently) responds No to the question about the definiteness of
her e-spin belief in the states | 'Huh?')Eve and | 'Wha?')Eve, by linearity she
will (incompetently) respond No to the question in the states | 'Believes e-
spin M/?')Eve, | 'Believes e-spin down')Eve.
So two completely parallel arguments for how to model Eve's response
yield utterly incompatible results and incompatible stories about the way
in which Eve is deluded. The Bare theory per se does not tell us which is
the correct model, because it contains no principle that stipulates in what
ways experimenters should be competent to report their beliefs, and in
what ways they should not. In other words, the Bare theory contains no
prescription that says that when Eve reflects about her own beliefs, Eve's
brain is hard-wired so that Albert's unitary evolution (5) gets turned on
inside her brain, as opposed to the unitary evolution just described. The
Bare theorist cannot treat evolution (5) as a kind of calibration condition
that defines what we mean by Eve's response acting as a good measure-
ment of the structure of her own beliefs. For the evolution which induces
her to respond No in both the | 'Huh?')Eve and | 'Wha?')Eve states is based
on an equally good calibration condition, given that under the Bare theory
the No response would be the correct one for those states.
However, this is still not enough to reject the Bare theorist's story out of
hand, for there is an easy way Albert can grant the point just made. No in-
terpretation of quantum mechanics should ever be called upon to decide a
priori how to model a given interaction. So, in this case, we are free to find
a model that fits the data that we never find people reporting that they fail
to have definite beliefs about things when they are in eigenstates of definite
belief—assuming that is an empirically established (or, at any rate, estab-
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lishable) fact. Then, the ability of the Bare theory to at least represent (if
not strictly deduce) the fact that experimenters never take their beliefs to
be indefinite is perhaps all that should be required.
But before this aspect of the Bare theory is shouted from the rooftops,
we would do well to put it into perspective. Compare what remains of the
Bare theory's explanatory strategy to the strategy adopted by nonstandard
interpretations of no-collapse quantum mechanics that inject variables,
worlds, or minds into the discussion to make definite Eve's beliefs in a
superposition such as (4).
The chief reason why standard thinkers about superpositions dislike
the nonstandard strategy is that it requires certain observables—such as
the observable whose eigenstates underpin Eve's beliefs—always to have
well-defined values, even when the observable's eigenstates are super-
posed by the quantum state of the system. Standard thinkers do not accept
that sort of discrimination between physical observables: as far as the for-
malism of quantum mechanics is concerned, all of its observables are on a
par. To single out whatever observable it is that grounds our beliefs as an
observable that it always makes sense to ascribe a definite value to regard-
less of quantum state is regarded as irredeemably ad hoc. There is just
nothing special about that observable as compared to any other; nothing
"preferred" about the set of belief eigenspaces in the Hilbert space repre-
senting Eve's brain over any other observable's eigenspaces in that space.
(And, of course, if we assume all observables have simultaneously definite
values all the time, that all sets of eigenspaces are on a par with respect to
determinacy, then we run into well-known difficulties with what we mean
by saying that every observable has a determinate value [see note 10].)
In that regard, however, the Bare theory's strategy for dealing with the
problem of what experimenters take themselves to believe on the basis of
their measurement devices is now no less objectionable than the nonstan-
dard approach. The nonstandard preferred-observable approach would say
that it just so happens in our world that "belief" is the kind of physical
observable for which it always makes sense to speak about having one be-
lief or another (where that may, in purely physical terms, amount to saying
that the particles in experimenters' brains take up one configuration over
another, if what we call beliefs turn out to be nothing other than certain
positions being taken up by certain brain particles). The Bare theorist has
to say that it just so happens in our world that the brain is hard-wired to
give us the kind of beliefs we take ourselves to have about our beliefs.
In fact, the analogy between the two explanatory strategies is far closer
than that. The difference between the unitary evolution that would make
Eve respond Yes and the one that would make her respond No is just a dif-
ference in choice of basis: either we decide that she is in fact competent to
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report the definiteness of her belief in both of two orthogonal belief eigen-
states, or we decide that she is in fact competent to report her lack of defi-
nite belief in both of two orthogonal woneigenstates of belief that span
the same plane. The comparable choice on a preferred-observable ap-
proach is between Eve's belief observable as determinate versus, say, the
observable with |'Huh?')Eve and |'Wha?')Eve as eigenstates. The formal
structure in quantum mechanics that needs to be distinguished by the Bare
theory to get a fix on modeling observers' reports is exactly the same struc-
ture preferred-observable approaches exploit, namely a preferred basis in
the subspace spanned by 'Believes e-spin up')Eve and | 'Believes e-spin
<&wn')Eve picked out by those two vectors.
So despite its name, the Bare theory cannot get by with less than non-
standard preferred-observable approaches do in explaining why experi-
menters report themselves to have definite beliefs. It cannot be claimed
that the Bare theory's choice is determined by empirical facts any more
than that can be claimed for the preferred-observable approaches. The fact
that experimenters respond Yes in belief eigenstates, and also respond like
that in any state that is a linear superposition of those eigenstates, is ex-
actly the sort of empirical fact preferred-observable approaches can point
to in justifying their own particular preference, namely, for the belief ob-
servable as the one that's determinate.
3. The Bare Theory Exposed
So far we have argued that if the Bare theory's story about how experi-
menters come to believe/report that their beliefs are definite is granted,
then it is no better off than preferred-observable approaches with respect
to the structure in the quantum formalism that needs to be distinguished.
We now turn to arguing that the Bare theory is actually worse off because
it does not succeed in explaining all that needs to be explained. The fi-
nal section of the chapter will point out how the preferred-observable ap-
proach succeeds exactly where the Bare theory falls short. The upshot will
be that this entire exercise concerning the Bare theory supplies a nice (even
if somewhat scholastic) argument for a preferred-observable approach to
universal no-collapse quantum mechanics.
It will be important, first, to be absolutely clear about what the standard
thinking about quantum states is, since our contention will be that Albert
does not follow that thinking to its logical conclusion.
There is no difficulty in capturing what standard thinking is about eigen-
states. If a physical system is in an eigenstate of an observable, then that
observable possesses the corresponding eigenvalue (or at least the system
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has the surefire disposition to behave as if that value were a property it
possesses). In superpositions of two (or more) distinct-eigenvalue eigen-
states of an observable, things are more delicate.
Suppose the eigenstates' eigenvalues are x and y. Then standard think-
ing entails that it would not be right to say in the superposition that the
observable has value x, nor would it be right to say it has value y, nor
would it be right to say it has both values, nor would it be right to say it
has neither value. This is Albert's own understanding of standard thinking
about superpositions (1992, ll,79n). However mind-boggling these asser-
tions might appear, they are the rules of the game that need to be followed
if the Bare theory is to be entertained.
Now in our thought experiment about Eve, Albert makes a conceptual
distinction between her brain as a repository of beliefs about e-spin, and
the aspects of her that reflect on her beliefs about e-spin and then report
on her reflections if she is asked questions about her beliefs. The fact that
she verbalizes her beliefs about her e-spin beliefs is unimportant, although
at one point Albert suggests it might be important: "[Eve] is necessarily
going to be convinced (or at any rate she is necessarily going to report)
that she does have a definite particular belief" (1992, 118). It cannot pos-
sibly be important, because if she does not think herself to have a definite
e-spin belief, then that is presumably going to be a problem for the Bare
theory regardless of what she reports. Furthermore, the very act of her
reporting that she has a definite e-spin belief should presumably induce
her to give assent to the content of her report, if the way we are modeling
Eve as a quantum-mechanical automaton is going to have any relation to
our own experience that we (in normal circumstances) don't bear witness
to things we aren't prepared to accept ourselves.
So we can view the eigenstates of Eve's reporting Yes that we intro-
duced earlier as eigenstates of her reflecting Yes (but not necessarily ver-
balizing the answer) without compromising the Bare theory in any way.
Then what Albert needs is a conceptual distinction between Eve's brain as
a retainer of beliefs about things such as e-spin and Eve's brain as it func-
tions in reflecting about the structure of those beliefs. For easy reference,
call these two faces of Eve the "inner" and "outer" Eve respectively.8 And
let's grant to Albert that they will interact in exactly the way he postulates,
that is, in accord with equations (5).
For Albert to make his point that the Bare theory predicts that Eve will
be deluded about the definiteness of her e-spin beliefs, he needs to establish
that the outer Eve draws a conclusion at variance with the Bare facts of the
matter about the inner Eve. And for both inner and outer Eve, Albert must
employ standard thinking to determine the Bare facts of the matter about
Eve's inner beliefs, and about her outer beliefs about her inner beliefs.
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The inner facts of the matter in the belief superposition are, in particu-
lar, that Eve doesn't believe up and she doesn't believe down. These are
quite specific negative claims about her situation. What we are leading up
to is that Albert unjustifiably pulls back from drawing a similar kind of
negative conclusion when outer Eve has the potential of getting into the
same kind of superposition.
When outer Eve reflects upon whether she has exactly one of the two be-
liefs in the set {Believes e-spin up, Believes e-spin down}, she always con-
cludes Yes (on the assumption that a particular unitary interaction, namely
(5), is singled out as modeling this act of reflection). So if the Bare theory
is true, Albert is right to observe that Eve is deluded when answering Yes
in the superposition. But if the Bare theory is true, we can also ask what it
will predict when Eve attempts to reflect upon what belief about e-spin she
has. Since she would then get into a superposition of believing that she be-
lieves up and believing that she believes down (assuming she is good at as-
certaining her specific beliefs in the eigenstate cases), under the Bare the-
ory she will be unable to specify which of the two beliefs she takes herself
to hold.
Recall what Albert says about that when Eve was being asked to report
to Adam her reflections about what e-spin belief she has while in the su-
perposition: "it won't be any easier to interpret a 'response' like that than
it was to interpret the superposition of brain states in [(4)] that that re-
sponse was intended to be a description of!" True enough. But the general
difficulties of interpreting superpositions notwithstanding, the Bare theory
has something quite specific to say about Eve getting into a superposition
of believing that she believes up and believing that she believes down. The
Bare theory says that outer Eve will not believe that she believes up and
will not believe that she believes down, in just the same way that it says
that inner Eve does not believe up and does not believe down.
The point is that we don't merely take ourselves to have "definite be-
liefs" in everyday life. After performing spin measurements on electrons,
we sometimes take ourselves to believe up and other times take ourselves
to believe down, depending on how our experiments go. The Bare theory
can only explain that when we perform measurements on electrons in spin
eigenstates—not in superpositions. The issue that seems to have been lost
sight of in all of this is that we also commonly believe that we have the
grounds for believing that we have definite beliefs, in the sense that on any
given occasion we are able to reflect on what our belief is!
Let's put it another way. Earlier in his book (1992,78-79), Albert takes
the problem of interpreting a universal quantum mechanics without the col-
lapse postulate to be that the theory predicts we should have no particular
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belief in a superposition when, by "direct introspection," we apparently
do. His strategy for the Bare theory is to see if we can get it to explain why
we take ourselves to have a definite belief in a superposition. But Albert
has merely solved a watered-down version of the problem. The problem is
not just to explain why we take our beliefs about things like e-spin to be
definite in some noncommittal sense, but why we take ourselves to believe
the specific things that we do apparently believe about e-spin! In trying to
get the Bare theory to explain that, it will (as Albert himself admits) land
outer Eve into the same sort of devastating superposition that inner Eve is
in. But that fact is hardly irrelevant to the Bare theory's inability to explain
what we take our specific beliefs to be.
The Bare theory's story about apparently definite beliefs is so seductive
(as each of the present authors knows from personal experience) that an-
ticipating responses to this quite elementary criticism we have just made
is obligatory.
Note, first, that we are not accusing the Bare theory of any flat-out logi-
cal contradiction with respect to Eve's beliefs. She does believe she has
exactly one of two e-spin beliefs, even while:
she doesn't believe that she has the up belief; and
she doesn't believe that she has the down belief. (10)
This is an extraordinary state of affairs, the likes of which we just don't
ever seem to find ourselves in. But surely it is no more logically con-
tradictory than asserting the provability within some formal system of
"Gv-iG"—where G is a Godel sentence of that formal system—while
denying the provability of G and the provability of -iG.
On the other hand, we are not making the move from (10) to:
she believes that she doesn 't have the up belief; and (11)
she believes that she doesn't have the down belief.
The pair of conclusions about Eve in (11) obviously do logically contra-
dict her taking herself to have exactly one of the two e-spin beliefs. But to
draw either of them on the Bare theory when Eve is in the superposition,
outer Eve would have to get into an eigenstate of belief about something
particular about e-spin that she doesn't believe. There has been no sugges-
tion of that possibility here.9
Nor do we need to establish anything like that. It suffices for our cri-
tique that the Bare theory is unable to represent the fact that we do some-
times take ourselves to believe a specified thing such as up when, accord-
ing to the theory, we are in a state like (4). That is, it suffices to point out
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that the Bare theory's standard thinking leaves Eve with no impression
whatsoever about whether or not she believes up on any particular occa-
sion, even granting that she is mistakenly convinced that her e-spin beliefs
are definite on all occasions.
Now we have granted Albert that Eve will mistakenly (but without be-
ing aware of her mistake) believe that she either believes e-spin to be up
or believes it to be down (which is, of course, what believing that her e-
spin belief is definite is all about). But then if she is rational and knows in
advance that she is measuring a spin-i particle, won't she also sometimes
conclude that she believes up, and other times conclude that she believes
down, even while she is in the superposition? That seems to be the obvious
way to read Albert's claim that Eve "effectively knows" e's spin.
But it's not on, for the simple reason that we cannot just endow Eve
with magical powers of reasoning that transcend her states of belief as
determined by the Bare theory. If we say that on some occasion while in
the superposition Eve draws the conclusion that she believes up from her
sense that her beliefs about e-spin are definite, we are saying something
that flatly contradicts the Bare theory unless she can get into an eigenstate
of drawing that conclusion. But the only way she can do that is if she is
actually in an eigenstate of believing up and not in the superposition, as
we have already emphasized.10
Another way to avoid our criticism might be for Albert to introduce a
third level of Eve (giving us now the three faces of Eve) that reflects upon
what her reflections about her beliefs are. When asked in the superposition
if her reflection on what her e-spin belief is agrees with her actual e-spin
belief, Eve can be modeled so as to respond (you guessed it) Yes. In fact,
this is exactly what Albert uses to explain the repeatability of measure-
ments, and the agreement between different experimenters who measure
the same electron as to what its spin is (1992, 119-20).
But that's not on either. Granted the Bare theory can explain intersub-
jective agreement between experimenters about what their measurement
outcomes are. But what cannot be explained is why sometimes the experi-
menters will take that agreement to be established because both their re-
sults were up. Mere "agreement" is not enough. The same goes for the
three faces of Eve. Even if her third face is convinced that her second- and
first-level selves are in accord about her particular e-spin belief, that does
nothing to give her any sense of what those selves have agreed to. Indeed,
agreement tests between first-, second-, third-... nth-level Eve could never
be used as the factual basis for her feeling or belief that she believes up
after some particular measurement trial, simply because in superposition
(4) she can never get into any sort of eigenstate that makes reference to
just the one particular belief up.n
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At this point the reader might have become suspicious about our intro-
duction of inner and outer Eve, and that our troubles with the Bare theory
stem from that naive conception of Eve. All there is to Eve is her beliefs
and the way she reports on them, and nothing in between! That is certainly
more faithful to Albert's text. But it does little to mute the problem; it only
changes the terms in which the problem needs to be stated. The problem
would then become that, even if Eve operationally qualifies as a person
convinced of the definiteness of her e-spin belief, in the superposition she
will never be able to qualify as a person convinced she has the particular
belief that e-spin is up. Talking about an introspective side of Eve versus
what an external observer would infer about what she takes her mental
state to be changes nothing. And this is so even if we demand—as Albert's
phrasing of Adam's question does—that Eve give verbal assent to the fact
that her e-spin belief is "not uncertain and not confused and not vague and
not superposed."
So much for anticipating possible responses to our main criticism. The
same criticism undermines the story Albert runs to explain why, on the
Bare theory, experimenters take themselves to have confirmed the statisti-
cal predictions of quantum mechanics through their measurements (1992,
120-23). In the limit of an infinite sequence of measurements, an experi-
menter's brain will get into a quantum state that lies in an eigenspace of
the relative frequency operator, with an eigenvalue equal to the quantum-
mechanically predicted frequency for the measured observable. And so,
according to the Bare theory, experimenters will take themselves to have
obtained sequences that agree, in their long-run frequencies, with quantum
statistical predictions.
But experimenters as we know them seem to believe far more than that.
They take themselves to have obtained particular sequences with particu-
lar characteristics. Merely getting into an eigenspace of the relative fre-
quency operator will not ensure that on the Bare theory, since there are
numerous distinct sequences that can yield the same long-run frequencies.
Albert's own problem with this story is that it is too idealized. Determi-
nateness with respect to the relative frequency operator is only achieved in
the limit of an infinite number of measurements (1992,124-25). But even
the Bare theory's idealized experimenter is unlike any we are ever likely
to meet (or be).
A similar point is made by Stein (1984) against Geroch's (1984) reading
of Everett's interpretation (which is essentially the Bare theory; see notes 2
and 3). Stein asks how we ordinarily go about checking that measurement
outcomes conform to the relative frequencies predicted by quantum me-
chanics, and answers (1984, 641, emphasis in the original): "We do so by
performing the experiments and noting and counting their outcomes." We
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too have argued that that part of our ordinary experience cannot be ac-
counted for on the Bare theory. However, Stein goes further than he should
(or needs to) in suggesting that Geroch's observers are committed to the
exclusive use of physically special apparatus designed to record only sta-
tistical information and "obliviate" particular outcomes:
Geroch would have us (conceptually at least) interpose, between the ex-
perimenters and the real observation, apparatus that is designed just to
detect whether or not the predicted frequencies (within the predicted
range of variability) have occurred: what we may call "obliviating ap-
paratus," designed expressly to ignore everything about the series of
experiments that was not predicted or precluded with practical certainty
by quantum mechanics. The idea that physicists might actually proceed
in this way—spend money and time on instrumentation (automatic re-
cording apparatus to feed data to computers, programs designed to re-
port only the predicted aspects of the data and to destroy all records of
details that were not predicted)—simply in the interest of conformity
to the Everett-Geroch interpretation, seems worthy of Swift's Academy
ofLagado. (1984, 642)
In spite of the initial qualification, it appears that Stein regards the oblivi-
ating apparatuses required by the Bare theory (in Albert's or Geroch's ver-
sion) as more than merely conceptual. This goes too far, since the Bare
theory has no need to postulate devious devices designed specifically to
lose or erase information about outcomes while retaining statistical in-
formation. The fact that an apparatus, or an observer's mind, only retains
long-run statistical information follows quite straightforwardly from the
observation that information is registered only if the state of the registering
system is an eigenstate of registering it! This is a direct consequence of the
standard thinking about superpositions employed in the Bare theory and
needs no further special physical assumptions about the design of mea-
surements, beyond those commonly granted in standard analyses of quan-
tum measurement. So while we agree with Stein's starting point, we be-
lieve he overstates the case.
Note, finally, that an idealized experimenter measuring an ensemble of
electrons in superposition (2) will, in the limit, approach an eigenstate of
answering Yes to the question, "Did you sometimes take yourself to be-
lieve up on the basis of your measurement result?" So isn't it the case,
after all, that the Bare theory can explain why we sometimes take our-
selves to believe up (and other times down) on the basis of our measure-
ments? No. The alleged explanation here trades on an ambiguity in the
word "sometimes." What's important is not just whether at some point or
other (sometimes) in the experimenter's measurement outcome sequence
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an up was taken to be registered, but whether on (say) trial number 13
(some particular time) the experimenter took him- or herself to have mea-
sured up. Again, getting into an eigenspace of the relative frequency op-
erator will not suffice for a definite answer to that question.
We conclude that the Bare theory fails to explain why we take our-
selves to have specific beliefs about measurement outcomes or outcome
sequences in generic experimental situations. The only conclusion left is
that if the Bare theory is true, then in states like (4) we really never believe
that we believe up nor do we ever believe that we believe down after (any
single!) measurement of an electron's spin. The same goes for believing
that we believe anything particular about measurement outcome sequences
beyond what their long-run frequencies are (and perhaps other features of
outcome sequences definable in the long run, such as their randomness).
If that's "What It Feels Like to Be in a Superposition" (Albert 1992, 112),
then the Bare theory bears far less on the actual experiences of actual ex-
perimenters than we have been led by Albert to believe.
4. A Fig Leaf for the Bare Theory
Fortunately, explanatory adequacy with regard to what we take ourselves
to believe is quickly restored on a preferred-observable approach to uni-
versal, no-collapse quantum mechanics that simply denies standard think-
ing about superpositions from the very beginning.12
On such an approach, all the endless problems about beliefs about be-
liefs and responses about beliefs engendered above are cut off at their roots.
Because any observable representing beliefs is granted the status of an ob-
servable that is always determinate, in superposition (4) inner Eve will
believe c, |2 of the time that e-spin is up and |c2 ^ of the time that e-spin
is down. Outer Eve will believe that she has definite beliefs, in agreement
with the Bare theory. But she will also take herself to believe up \z\ \2 of
the time and to believe down c212 of the time. And this is exactly in accord
with all the things experimenters take themselves to believe. They will not
be left (unknowingly) deluded, but more important, not be left without a
sense of what they take their specific beliefs about e-spin to be.
So making belief the preferred observable (whatever the physical basis
of our beliefs turns out to be) is exactly the fig leaf the Bare theory needs
to fill the gap between guaranteeing that experimenters have the sense that
their beliefs are definite, and giving them the specific feelings they get
about the specific beliefs they hold.
Albert's Bare theory argument concerning what Eve takes herself to be-
lieve, the argument that we have spent the bulk of this paper analyzing,
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goes back at least as far as the paper by Albert and Loewer (1988). Inter-
estingly, they do not treat the Bare theory as a possible end in itself, but
use it as a springboard to draw a conclusion that is the same in spirit as
our own.
Albert and Loewer use the Eve scenario to argue that if we maintain the
idea that experimenters never report that their beliefs are definite when that
is in fact false, then their belief states cannot supervene on a superposition
like (4), but must be specified in addition to it (1988, 205). In other words,
accurate reporting requires a preferred-observable approach with the ob-
servable that underpins Eve's beliefs always taken to be determinate inde-
pendently of the quantum state of Eve.13
We agree with Albert and Loewer's conclusion that the Eve scenario
most naturally points to a preferred-observable approach, and that assum-
ing reports of belief defmiteness are accurate (and there is no collapse) en-
tails that conclusion. But we have shown that one can arrive at that conclu-
sion without any such assumption. Our point has been that the Bare theory
is too bare to account for the specificity of what we take ourselves to be-
lieve, and that actual determinateness of beliefs (as opposed to effective
determinateness) is necessary to account for that specificity.
The Bare theory's Adam and Eve fall short of what we take ourselves
to be like. Having eaten of the fruit from the tree of the knowledge of up
and down, we know what's up.
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1. Writing down a ket like | 'Believes e-spin «p')Eve carries with it no commitment
to there being a unique way to instantiate a state of Eve physically that would count (by
operationalist or other criteria) as a state of her believing up. Furthermore, the quantum-
mechanical observable that underpins "belief," whatever it is, is bound to be degenerate
simply on the grounds that any particular belief, like the belief that e-spin is up, may be
held concurrently with a host of other beliefs about other topics—beliefs that will vary
from one experimenter to another.
2. Albert (1992,124) sees the Bare theory as an attractive way to elaborate Everett's
(1957) ideas as a "one world" theory that preserves the standard way of thinking about
superpositions (that is, a theory based on the "eigenvalue-eigenstate link" as the criterion
for value-definiteness or determinateness). While Albert cites Lockwood (1989), who fol-
lows Deutsch (1985), Geroch (1984) has also independently proposed an interpretation of
Everett that is very much along the same lines. For more recent technical and conceptual
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elaborations of this sort of "bare" interpretation of Everett, see Barrett (1994,1995,1996).
Note that these interpretations differ from Bell's (1987) "one world" interpretation of
Everett. Bell's interpretation—as he puts it (1987,133), "the pilot-wave theory without the
trajectories"—is a preferred-observable interpretation of the type considered in section 2,
with position in configuration space as the preferred, always determinate observable. We
shall not be concerned here with the murky topic of Everett exegesis.
3. Geroch (cf. previous note) puts the aim of this explanatory project well: "what
must be accounted for, if anything, is, not the specific classical outcomes deemed to have
occurred for a specific experiment, but rather the general human impression that classical
outcomes do occur" (1984, 628-29). But, unlike Albert, Geroch does no more than sketch
how one might try to complete the project, and remains agnostic about its feasibility. Thus
he continues: "This problem may well be soluble, but is probably beyond our present abili-
ties; and, in any case, is basically not a problem in quantum mechanics" (1984, 629).
4. It is not important for what follows that the particulars of how Eve responds be
the same in the two eigenstates of her e-spin belief (that is, responding with a whisper or a
scream, via one set of neurons firing in her brain over another set that could equally well
do the job, and so on). It is only important that the content of her response be the same. In
other words, if we consider the subspace in the Hilbert space of Eve spanned by all those
states of her that we are willing to count (by operational or other criteria) as states in which
the content of her response is Yes, then what's important is that the two occurrences of the
ket 'Yes, I have a definite e-spin belief'}Eve in (5) both be vectors that lie in that subspace.
They need not generate the same ray, even though we have not taken the trouble to reflect
that possibility in our notation.
5. For present purposes, we can think of Eve's physical state as an element of the
tensor product of the Hilbert space that represents the features of her brain that register
beliefs about e-spin with the Hilbert space associated with the parts of Eve involved in
reflecting on what her beliefs are and responding to questions about them. It does not matter
whether the part(s) of Eve's brain associated with the relevant beliefs are individuated neu-
roanatomically or functionally, that is, whether a Token or Type physicalism is taken to
apply. And our case against the Bare theory is unaffected even if one eschews mind-brain
identity in favor of the neurological causes of mere belief reports.
6. It should perhaps be pointed out that Albert is not entirely uncritical of these
stories himself (1992,124-25). But once our "decisive" problem is laid out, it will become
clear that we believe Albert should have been critical of these stories at a far earlier stage
in his exposition.
7. It might have occurred to the reader that interaction (5) physically amounts to
nothing more than a measurement of the value of the projection operator onto the subspace
spanned by | 'Believes e-spin up'}Em and | 'Believes e-spin down')Em and, as such, carries
little information about Eve's physical state beyond the fact that it lies in that subspace. But
Albert is well aware of this (see his particle in a box analogy [1992, 117n]). Albert's point
is that Eve in the superposition will be responding to Adam's question in exactly the same
way as she would if she were in an eigenstate of e-spin belief (at least with regard to the
content of her answer; see note 4), and therefore she (and others) will be given all the same
impressions about her state of mind in the two cases. What purely physical meaning one
assigns to all of this, in terms of what observable of Eve has actually been measured via
(5), would presumably be regarded by Albert as beside the point.
8. This really is for ease of reference: we are not suggesting that Eve has multiple
personalities, but only that she is capable of forming beliefs and also (second-order) beliefs
about her beliefs. That much is necessary to get the story about Eve's delusion about her
beliefs off the ground.
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9. Evidently, the closest one can get to (11) on the Bare theory is to have Adam ask
Eve the question, "Do you lack exactly one of the two beliefs in the set {Believes up,
Believes down}!" Eve will (presumably) respond Yes to this in the superposition if that
was her response to the original question about having exactly one of those two beliefs
(that is, setting aside the previous section's worries about Yes versus No). But clearly an-
swering Yes to both questions is logically consistent. Nevertheless, the Bare theory again
remains explanatorily inadequate with respect to the specific things about e-spin we take
ourselves not to believe subsequent to a particular measurement trial on an electron's spin.
10. The fact that superposed Eve is never able to take herself to believe up or take
herself to believe down, even though she takes herself to believe exactly one of those, is
analogous to a well-known difficulty faced by realistic quantum logic (as defended, for
example, by Putnam [1975]) in its attempt to render meaningful statements such as "Every
observable has a definite value." Recall that the difficulty is that, even though the proposi-
tion "Observable O has a definite value" may be identified with the disjunction "Q! or o2
or ... or on"—where (for any i) o, is the proposition "Observable O has value o,"—the
truth of this disjunction, which is a tautology in quantum logic, turns out to be compatible
with the falsity of all of its disjuncts. What makes this a difficulty for realistic quantum
logic is that it waters down the very realism of definite values that logic was designed to
prop up. By analogy, what we have argued against the Bare theory is that Eve's impression
of the definiteness of her e-spin belief, expressed through her belief in a disjunction over
her believing up versus down, necessarily yields only a watered-down representation of our
actual experience, because Eve's belief cannot be accompanied, on any given occasion, by
belief that a particular one of those disjuncts is true. However, there is a downside to this
quantum logic analogy: we do not (and need not) claim that the Bare theory forces Eve (or
Adam) to understand her answer to Adam as a conscious endorsement of quantum over
classical logic. Indeed, just as Adam can ask Eve what she thinks about the definiteness of
her e-spin belief and will always elicit a Yes response, he will always elicit that same re-
sponse by asking her whether she takes the structure of her beliefs to conform to the logic
of the classical "or"!
11. Jeff Barrett (in correspondence with the authors) has suggested another possible
way to bring the Bare theory closer to endowing Eve with the (illusory) sense that her e-
spin belief has the content that it should have. Let Eve make spin measurements on three
identical electrons: the first in an up eigenstate, the second in a down eigenstate, and the
third in a superposition thereof. Again, Eve will believe she formed a definite belief about
all three measurement results. But, furthermore, she will believe that the result of her last
measurement was indistinguishable (in its content and the impression it left on her) from
the result of exactly one of her first two measurements! Alas, this new "agreement argu-
ment" is still too weak to explain why it is that we think we can specify which of the first
two measurement results the third agreed with. Put another way, the Bare theory cannot
vindicate the belief that the third result was indistinguishable from the first result, or the
belief that it was indistinguishable from the second. Beliefs of this sort may well be mis-
takenly acquired in our world, but the Bare theory is still at a loss to explain why.
12. Note that preferred-observable interpretations, as we understand them, include
the modal interpretations discussed by several contributors to this volume. In a modal
interpretation formulated along the lines of the versions originally proposed by Kochen
(1985) and by Dieks (1989), the preferred observable is derived from the quantum state
and is therefore time-dependent, as opposed to a preferred-observable interpretation with a
fixed, always determinate, observable. For a detailed analysis comprehending both these
ways of choosing a preferred observable, see Bub and Clifton (1996). The situation is more
complicated in Healey's (1989) modal interpretation; see Clifton (1996) for further discus-
THE BARE THEORY HAS NO CLOTHES 57
sion. Bacciagaluppi, Elby, and Hemmo (1996) have shown how the determinateness of ob-
servables representing beliefs in the Kochen-Dieks modal interpretation requires decoher-
ence arguments.
13. Albert and Loewer go on to argue that the best preferred-observable approach
involves invoking "many-minds," but we do not wish to enter into that discussion here.
Suffice it to say that we believe everything presently under discussion is neutral with re-
spect to how one makes the preferred observable preferred, whether it be in terms of (one
or many) hidden variables, worlds, or minds.
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